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...for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk...
Immanuel Kant (1784)
1 Introduction
Broadly speaking, there are two theories regarding the effects of government activity
on the economy.1 Some economists emphasize the crucial role of government in securing
property rights, enforcing contracts, providing national security and, perhaps, guarantee-
ing a moderate minimum income for every one. These proponents do not deny that some
government activity is better than none and they would probably argue that at a small
scale, public production exhibits very large marginal productivity. These marginal prod-
ucts, however, then decline quickly and eventually become negative. Other economists
believe that government is most productive if it operates on a large scale because of
increasing returns. According to this view, operating on a small scale, the marginal
product of government activity is moderate as it merely serves to appease the poor, yet
fails to exhaust their full economic potential.2
The question which of these two theories is right cannot be answered by a priory
arguments.3 However, it is crucial to know whether in the long run efficient policies are
1See, e.g., Hayek (1944), Hazlitt (1946) and Friedman (1962, 1997) or Rosenstein-Rodan (1943),
Myrdal (1975) and Sachs (2005).
2This hypothesis is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
3Blendon, Benson, Brodie, Morin, Altman, Gitterman, Brossard, and James (1997) conducted an
opinion survey showing that there is a substantial gap between economists’ and the public’s beliefs
about how the economy functions. Fuchs, Blinder, and Poterba (1998) report findings from another
survey that there are significant differences even among professional economists about policy questions
as well as parameter estimates. This can be regarded as evidence of uncertainty about which is the
correct model. Bartels (1996) notes that the ”[t]he political ignorance of the American voter is one
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chosen, i.e., whether experience will eventually lead the economy to learn the truth. This
is the question we address in this paper. For this purpose, we construct a model with
uncertainty about how the economy functions. The decision maker does not know which
of two possible production functions for a public good is the true one. For any given
belief, the policy maker maximizes his short-run expected utility and, after observing
the tax rate and the level of production of the public good, updates her beliefs using
Bayes’ rule. We show that in the long run the true production function may be learned,
but the economy may also converge to an inefficient policy where no further inference
is possible so that the economy is stuck in an information trap. We also show that this
result is robust with respect to experimentation.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, we investigate the correctness
of Kant’s optimistic view on the prospects of enlightenment, expressed in the quote
above and in the following (Kant, 1784, fourth paragraph):4 “But that the public should
enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is
almost inevitable.” One of the policies adopted in the long-run equilibrium of our model
is the Kantian policy. The other policy is non-Kantian in the sense that the economy is
stuck in an information trap, where the truth will never be learned. Interestingly, this
latter policy can be Pareto inefficient. In this respect, our paper is related to Hess and
Orphanides (2001) who investigate the correctness of Kant’s perpetual peace hypothesis.5
of the best-documented features of contemporary politics, but the political significance of this political
ignorance is far from clear.”
4For a more modern, similarly optimistic view, see Wittman (1989).
5They show that Kant’s conjecture that a world populated exclusively by democracies generates per-
petual peace is correct insofar as perpetual peace is an equilibrium outcome if there are only democratic
regimes. However, even such a world does not necessarily imply perpetual peace as there are other
equilibria where wars occur with positive probability.
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Second, the paper relates to the political economy literature on heterogenous social
beliefs that are consistent with either multiple equilibria or long-run divergence in beliefs,
such as Piketty (1995), Spector (2000) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).6 In contrast to
Piketty and Spector, in our model all households share the same information and beliefs,
but are eventually hindered from learning the truth.An important difference between
our model and the one of Alesina and Angeletos is that their equilibria can be ranked
unambiguously only from the point of view of the median household.7
Third, our paper relates to the literature on learning. Our main finding is related to
the well-known result that impatient Bayesian learners can optimally fail to learn the
true parameter values (see, e.g., Easley and Kiefer, 1988).8 In this strand of literature,
the most important predecessor to our paper is McLennan (1984) who studies learning
by a monopolistic seller who faces two linear demand functions intersecting at some
price and who is uncertain about which of the two is true.9 The paper is also related
to Laslier, Trannoy, and Van Der Straeten (2003) who study voting over unemployment
6There is a substantial political economy literature that deals with asymmetric information where
one type of player is better informed than another; see, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982), Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1996), Schultz (1996) or Heidhues and Lagerlo¨f (2003). Schultz studies a setting where
“voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy”. The effects of extending
our model in this direction are discussed in Section 4.2.
7Moreover, the sources of multiplicity are quite different. In their model, multiplicity stems from
differences in social beliefs about which fraction of income is fair or merited, whereas in ours it arises
from incomplete information and incomplete learning.
8Insofar as incomplete learning is concerned, a very similar phenomenon obtains in models of herding
such as Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). However, the reasons for
incomplete learning are very different in the two types of models.
9In every period, the seller in McLennan’s model observes whether there is sale or not and updates
his beliefs accordingly. Among other things he shows that with positive probability the seller ends
up charging the price where the two demand functions intersect, at which point no further learning is
possible. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between our model and McLennan’s is deferred
to the end of section 3.
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benefits when households do not know the (a fortiori unobserved) distribution of skills
of the unemployed. They uncover a possibility of inefficiency that is quite similar to our
finding. An important contrast is that in our model the dynamics are not monotone.10
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 analyzes the dynamic learning process. Section 4 extends the model by intro-
ducing experimentation by the policy maker. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in
the Appendix.
2 The model
There is a continuum of individuals whose total mass is normalized to one. Individual
income yi is distributed according to the density function f(yi). The mean income is one
and the median income is denoted by ym. The support of the distribution is [yinf , ysup]
with 0 ≤ yinf < ysup <∞. Each individual i derives utility from private consumption ci
and from a public goodH(g), which is a function of government expenditure g. Individual
i’s utility is ui = ci+H(g). Note that individuals differ only with respect to their private
consumption, but are identical with respect to their valuation of the public good. Since
mean income is one, the government’s budget constraint is g = τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is a
flat tax rate. Accordingly, individual i’s consumption is ci = (1− τ)yi.
We assume that H(g) is twice differentiable, strictly concave and increasing in g for g
close to zero. This assumption makes sure that for every household there is a unique bliss
10The dynamics of our model are more similar to those in Baron (1996), who analyzes voting over
public goods programs by a legislature when there is uncertainty about which legislators can make
proposals in future periods. As in our model, the economy “hops” towards its absorbing state, which in
his model is given by the complete information bliss point of the median voter. In contrast to Baron’s
model, we have two absorbing states, one of which can be Pareto inefficient.
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point tax rate. Using the budget restrictions g = τ and ci = (1− τ)yi, we can replace ci
and g and write i’s utility as a function of the tax rate only, ui(τ) = (1 − τ)yi +H(τ).
Note that H(τ) is concave in τ . We denote by τ i individual i’s optimal tax rate, which is
implicitly defined by ∂H
∂τ
(τ i) = yi. Since H(τ) is concave, τ
i is decreasing in yi. Thus, the
single crossing property is satisfied (see Gans and Smart, 1996; Persson and Tabellini,
2000, ch. 2, condition 2.4). Denote by τm the optimal tax rate of the median income
household.
We further assume that H and the income distribution satisfy ysup < ∂H
∂g
(0) and
∂H
∂g
(y) < yinf . Therefore, even the richest individual prefers some government activity to
none and even the poorest individual’s preferred tax rate is less than one. Put differently,
only the tax rates τ ∈ P ≡ [τ I , τ II ] with τ I ≡ H ′−1(ysup) > 0 and τ I ≡ H ′−1(yinf ) < 1
will be Pareto efficient.
We consider a decision maker who in each period chooses the tax rate that maximizes
the median income household’s utility um = (1 − τ)ym + H(τ). Two comments are in
order here. First, it is easy to construct a model with electoral competition along the lines
of Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 3) which would yield the median voter equilibrium
where both parties choose the tax rate the maximizes the median income household’s
utility. Second, our learning results also hold if the decision maker chooses a different
tax policy. For example, he could choose a tax rate that maximizes the income of the
40th percentile or the 55th percentile. In this sense our approach is more general than
a focus on a median voter model.11 In particular, in Section 4 we show that our results
11In a previous version of the paper we also modelled electoral competition. We are thankful to the
editor to point out that our stylized Downsian model limited the scope of our results.
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hold when the decision maker chooses a random tax policy.
We now introduce two production functions HA(τ) and HB(τ) satisfying the assump-
tions made above. These are supposed to represent the two distinct, commonly held
views on the effect of government activity on the economy described above. The deci-
sion maker has the initial belief α1 that the production function HA is the true one, with
0 < α1 < 1. In every period t, he uses the observed outcomes ht to update his beliefs
αt+1. Without loss of generality, we assume that HA(τ) is the true production function.
Let PA ≡ [τ IA, τ IIA ] and PB ≡ [τ IB, τ IIB ] be the sets of Pareto efficient tax rates associated
with the production functionHA andHB, respectively. Let τ
m
A and τ
m
B be the optimal tax
rates for the median household under HA and HB, i.e.,
∂HA
∂τ
(τmA ) = y
m and ∂HB
∂τ
(τmB ) =
ym. Note that τmA ∈ PA and τmB ∈ PB and observe that τmA can be called the Kantian
policy since it is the policy that would be chosen if the true production function was
known to the policy maker. Without loss of generality we assume that τmA < τ
m
B .
We assume also that the two functions cross at most once for τ > 0. If they do not
cross, or cross only at some τ 6∈ [τmA , τmB ], the updating problem is fairly simple, as we
shall see in Corollary 2 below. Henceforth, with the exception of this corollary, we focus
on the case where the two production functions cross, as depicted in the bottom line of
Figure 1.
The production function representing the view that the optimal size of government
is small has a shape like HA in the bottom panels in Figure 1. It is very steep when τ
is close to zero, but then flattens quickly and eventually decreases in τ . The production
function reflecting the view that government is most efficient if large has a shape similar
to HB in the bottom panels in Figure 1, which is not very steep at the origin but flattens
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Figure 1: Four variants.
much slower than HA. If our sketch of these two opposing views is correct, then the two
functions HA and HB will have to intersect at some point, which we denote by τ˜ .
12
The production of the public good is exposed to uncertainty. If τt is the tax rate in
period t, then the decision maker observes the outcome
ht(τt, εt) = HA(τt) + εt , (1)
where εt is an error term drawn randomly in every period. This error term εt captures
factors influencing the policy outcome except the policy itself. The error terms are
normally and independently distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2; we denote its
probability density function by φ(εt).
13 Note that without noise, the learning process,
12Conceptionally, τ˜ corresponds to the price in McLennan (1984) where the demand functions inter-
sect.
13The normality assumption is only sufficient. As becomes clear from the proof of Proposition 2,
all our results will hold for any distribution f(εt) that have full support and whose likelihood ratio
l(εt) ≡ f(HB(τt)+εt)f(εt) is monotone in εt and takes on values from zero to infinity.
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described below, would be degenerate since one observation would be sufficient to identify
the true production function.
In period t + 1, the entire history Ht ≡ {(hj, τj)}tj=1 of previously implemented tax
rates and associated policy outcomes is known to the decision maker. Since his belief in
period t that HA is the true is αt, the expected level of the public good in period t for
tax rate τt is
Ht(τt) ≡ αtHA(τt) + (1− αt)HB(τt) . (2)
3 Dynamics and long-run equilibria
We now derive the long-run equilibrium in our model. We assume that in every period t
the decision maker maximizes myopically the expected utility of the median households
utility (1−τmt )ym+Ht(τmt ). This assumption is a good approximation if periods are long
compared to the patience of households. The learning problem we explore captures the
decision problem of a decision maker who faces uncertainty about which of two models of
reality is the correct one and whose actions affect both his current period payoff and his
future beliefs. The decision maker can be the government of a country, like a (benevolent
or malevolent) dictator or a democratically elected president or a monopolistic seller who
faces intersecting demand functions.14.
Proposition 1 characterizes the decision maker’s optimal policy.
Proposition 1 In every period t, the decision maker chooses τmt ∈ [τmA , τmB ], where τmt
is implicitly defined by H ′t(τ
m
t ) ≡ ym .
Figure 2 depicts the policy maker’s choice. His initial belief α1 is such that the
14Or an athlete or a student who does not know whether he should practice harder or less hard.
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expected production function in period 1 is H1. The policy implemented in period 1 is
τm1 .
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Figure 2: Equilibrium outcome in period 1.
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Figure 3: Inferences and outcome in period 2, as a function of ε1.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the error term on the decision maker’s belief and
on the equilibrium tax rate in the next period. After implementing τm1 , the shock ε1
materializes. If ε1 > 0, the outcome is better than expected under H1, and therefore,
the updated belief is α2 > α1 and the new expected production function H2 is as shown
in the left hand panel. On the other hand, if ε1 < 0, the outcome is worse than expected
under H1, and therefore α2 < α1 yielding H2 as shown in the right hand panel. In both
cases, the expected production function H2 is the basis for equilibrium in period 2.
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Note that only a strict subset of the feasible tax rates are implemented in equilibrium,
i.e., τmt ∈ [τmA , τmB ] ⊂ [0, 1]. This property is illustrated in Figure 4.
0 1
0
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1
1.5
2
2.5
3
τ
HA 
HB 
range of τm
t
τmA  
τm
B
slope = ym 
Figure 4: Range of equilibrium tax rates.
3.1 An informal discussion
The decision maker’s problem is a problem of inference. Recall that Ht ≡ {(hi, τi)}ti=1 is
the history up to date t. Accordingly, let Pr(HA
∣∣Ht) denote the conditional probability
that HA is true given history Ht. Denote by Pr(ht
∣∣HA, τt) the probability of observing
ht given that HA is true and given that policy τt is implemented. Then, by Bayes rule
Pr(HA|Ht) = Pr(HA|Ht−1) Pr(ht|HA,τt)Pr(HA|Ht−1) Pr(ht|HA,τt)+(1−Pr(HA|Ht−1)) Pr(ht|HB ,τt) . (3)
Since households are rational, they use Bayes rules (3) to update their beliefs, i.e., αt+1 =
Pr(HA|Ht). Since the probability of observing ht is higher under the true production
function HA than under HB, αt+1 should be expected to converge to one as the number
of observations gets large. However, recall that the two production functions intersect
at τ˜ which implies that Pr(ht|HA, τ˜) = Pr(ht|HB, τ˜). Inspection of (3) reveals that in
this case, αt+1 = αt. The observation ht is equally likely under production function HA
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as under HB. In this case, the learning process comes to a halt. Let α˜ be the belief such
that in equilibrium τ˜ is implemented. That is, α˜ solves α˜H ′A(τ˜) + (1 − α˜)H ′B(τ˜) = ym,
where τ˜ is such that HA(τ˜) = HB(τ˜). Clearly, α˜ ∈ (0, 1) exists and is unique.
3.2 The information trap
We now state our main result:
Proposition 2 Let the two production functions cross at some τ˜ ∈ (τmA , τmB ). Then, the
only policies that can be implemented in a long-run equilibrium are τ˜ and τmA . Formally,
a random variable τ∞ ∈ [0, 1] exists such that (i) τmt converges to τ∞ almost surely as t
becomes arbitrarily large, and (ii) the support of τ∞ is {τ˜ , τmA }.
The content of Proposition 2 is that the policy converges to a random variable whose
support is τ˜ and τmA . This is equivalent to saying that the process of beliefs converges to
a random variable whose support consists solely of α˜ and 1. The result in Proposition
2 is similar to the finding of Hess and Orphanides (2001): What Kant conjectured -
enlightenment being inevitable in our case, perpetual peace in their case - is indeed an
equilibrium outcome, but it is not the only equilibrium outcome.
The reason why there is a range around τ˜ from which the policy can eventually not
escape is that the two production functions have very similar values in the neighborhood
of τ˜ . The closer one gets to τ˜ , the less distinguishable the true and the false production
function become. Once one is close enough to τ˜ , it thus becomes very difficult to learn
anything. Hence, the economy becomes stuck with its current beliefs once these are
sufficiently close to α˜, as a consequence of which policy will not change anymore. Hence,
one can speak of an information trap around τ˜ .
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Proposition 2 states that the economy converges to either τmA or τ˜ . If τ
II
A < τ˜ < τ
I
B
the Pareto sets of HA and HB are disjoint and τ˜ lies in between them, i.e. is Pareto
inefficient. The conditions for this require that HA and HB are sufficiently different.
From now on we assume that τ˜ is Pareto inefficient.
Corollary 1 If τ IIA < τ˜ < τ
I
B, then the economy can converge to a Pareto inefficient
policy.
That is, if τ IIA < τ˜ < τ
I
B holds, then learning the truth is particularly relevant as
failure to do so implies that policy implemented in the long-run equilibrium is Pareto
inefficient.
Proposition 2 has a corollary that follows almost immediately.
Corollary 2 If the two production functions do not cross on [τmA , τ
m
B ], then τ
m
t converges
almost surely to τmA as t goes to infinity.
Two comments are in order. First, from the proof of Proposition 2 it is clear that all
our results go through if HB for τ close to zero as long HB is concave for all τ ≥ τmA .15
Second, Corollary 2 is probably not surprising. If the two models never make the same
predictions over the relevant interval [τmA , τ
m
B ], households will ultimately learn the truth.
3.3 The efficiency potential
Next we present an analytical result for the lower bound of the probability that the
policy converges to τmA . For that purpose, we define the efficiency potential as this
minimal probability, which we denote as ξ. That is, ξ ≡ inf Pr (limt→∞ τt → τmA | α1, τ˜) .
15This guarantees in particular that the function s ≡ HA−HB satisfies s′(τ) < 0 for all τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ].
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Proposition 3 The efficiency potential is strictly smaller than one and, if positive,
increases in the quality of the initial belief α1 and decrease in α˜. Formally,
ξ = max
{
0,
α1 − α˜
α1(1− α˜)
}
and
∂ξ
∂α1
> 0,
∂ξ
∂α˜
< 0 for ξ > 0.
The fact that ∂ξ
∂α1
> 0 is very intuitive since one naturally expects a decision maker
who is initially better informed to be more likely to adopt the correct belief in the long-
run. The sign of the derivative ∂ξ
∂α˜
< 0 is also intuitive, but understanding it requires
a moment’s reflection. For a given α1 > α˜, a series of bad shocks is required for the
beliefs to be downgraded to α˜. Obviously, as α˜ decreases, a longer series of bad shocks
is required for beliefs to be downgraded to α˜. Since a longer series of bad shocks is less
likely, the efficiency potential increases as α˜ decreases.
3.4 McLennan’s model
As metioned in the introduction our model of learning is closely related to McLennan
(1984). Let us therefore discuss the similarities and differences. The two models are very
similar in that both assume that there is a policy (τ˜ in our model, a in McLennan’s;
for simplicity, we discuss both models using our notation) that, once taken, will inhibit
any further inference. The main difference between the two resides in the nature of the
random variable, which is binary (sale, no sale) in McLennan’s and continuous in our
model. The simpler structure allows McLennan to derive the result that under certain
restrictions the seller’s belief α never jumps over α˜. That is, if he starts with α1 < α˜,
his long run belief α∞ will be either 0 or α˜ and if he starts with α1 > α˜ it will be either
α˜ or 1. No such result obtains in our model because for any given αt ∈ (0, α˜) there is
Berentsen, Bruegger and Loertscher 15
always a positive probability that a shock occurs such that αt+1 > α˜.
16
One important consequence of this is that we cannot use McLennan’s (1984, p. 343-
4) arguments to establish analytically that α˜ is reached with positive probability. To see
this, observe first that our Proposition 3 is actually a statement conditional on HA being
true. Without this condition, it would read: The support of τ∞ is {τmB , τ˜ , τmA }, or in terms
of beliefs, the support of α∞ is {0, α˜, 1}. Second, denote by p0(α), p˜(α) and p1(α) the
unconditional probability of converging to the absorbing state 0, α˜ and 1, respectively.
Since p0(α), p˜(α) and p1(α) are probabilities and because all paths converge,
p0(α) = 1− p˜(α)− p1(α). (4)
Then because of the elementary property of Bayesian updating that the expected pos-
terior is equal to the prior,
p0(α)0 + p˜(α)α˜ + p1(α) = α. (5)
In contrast to McLennan, who has the additional restriction that for, say, α < α˜ the
only absorbing states are {0, α˜}, the system of the two equations (4) and (5) with three
unknowns is indeterminate. Without additional restrictions, neither p˜ = 0 nor p˜ > 0
can be ruled out. Therefore, it is not possible to prove that p˜(α) > 0 along the lines in
McLennan (p. 343-4), as suggested by one careful reader.
3.5 Numerical results
The distribution of the long-run beliefs α∞ cannot be calculated explicitly. We therefore
have to rely on simulations in order to approximate the probability that beliefs converge
16To see this, observe that αt+1(εt) = αtαt+(1−αt)l(εt) , where l(εt) is the likelihood ratio that as a
function of the shock εt can take any value between zero and infinity. Consequently, αt+1 is a random
variable with support (0, 1).
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to α∞ = α˜ and α∞ = 1, respectively. Our simulations suggest that convergence to τ˜
occurs for a wide range of initial conditions. This is of particular interest because τ˜ can
be Pareto inefficient (Corollary 1).
The simulation results are collected in the two tables below for two different constel-
lations of production functions.17 Figure 5 shows three functions which are taken as the
production function of the public good. For Table 1, we use the blue function (HA) as
the true production function, and the green function (HG) as the alternative production
function. For Table 2, again the blue function (HA) is the true production function and
the red one (HR) is the alternative. An entry in the table is the share of draws for which
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
 HG
 HA
 HR
Figure 5: The functions used for the simulations reported in Tables 1 and 2.
the belief converged to 1 for a given combination of initial belief α1 and noise σ. For
every entry we did a hundred draws. One minus the table entry gives the share of draws
that converged to the inefficient tax rate.18 For example, the 1 in the top left entry of
Table 1 means that for α1 = 0.1 and σ = 0.2 every draw converged to 1, for the blue
(true) and green (untrue) production function. Note that the smaller σ, the higher the
probability of reaching τmA . This is intuitive because a smaller variance of the shocks
17All Matlab-files are available at http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/witheo/aleks/.
18Note that, as claimed in Proposition 2, all draws either converge to τmA or to τ˜ .
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HA and HG
α˜ = 0.47
σ = 0.2 σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 ξ
α1 = 0.1 1 0.99 0.21 0.01 0
α1 = 0.2 1 0.98 0.26 0.02 0
α1 = 0.3 1 0.98 0.24 0 0
α1 = 0.4 1 0.99 0.21 0 0
α1 = 0.5 1 0.97 0.25 0.10 0.12
α1 = 0.6 1 1 0.57 0.48 0.42
α1 = 0.7 1 0.99 0.76 0.67 0.62
α1 = 0.8 1 1 0.94 0.76 0.78
α1 = 0.9 1 1 0.91 0.92 0.90
Table 1: Results when HA is true and HG is the alternative.
HA and HR
α˜ = 0.52
σ = 0.2 σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 ξ
α1 = 0.1 0.99 0.36 0.01 0 0
α1 = 0.2 1 0.29 0 0 0
α1 = 0.3 1 0.28 0 0 0
α1 = 0.4 1 0.29 0 0 0
α1 = 0.5 1 0.21 0 0 0
α1 = 0.6 1 0.58 0.31 0.29 0.27
α1 = 0.7 1 0.75 0.59 0.58 0.53
α1 = 0.8 1 0.92 0.76 0.71 0.73
α1 = 0.9 1 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.88
Table 2: Results when HA is true and HR is the alternative.
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increases the informativeness of the policy outcome.
Three further remarks are in order. First, the efficiency potential ξ has some bite
indeed. For σ = 2, ξ is quite close to the numerical results both in Table 1 and 2. Thus,
ξ is not a merely theoretical lower bound. Second, the difference between the numerical
results and the efficiency potential for σ = 2 and α1 = 0.5 in Table 1 and for α1 = 0.8 in
Table 2 is not statistically significant.19 Third, consider the columns for σ = 1 in Table
1 and σ = 0.5 in Table 2 to see that the probability of convergence to the good policy
does not increase monotonically in the initial belief α1.
20 The intuition for this behavior
seems to be that starting from very bad initial beliefs, i.e. α1 close to zero, increases in
α1 may well increase the likelihood of adopting a good policy in the long-run. However,
as α1 becomes larger it gets closer to α˜ and thereby increases the probability of adopting
a bad policy in the long-run. Witness in particular that the minima in these columns
are reached for the α1 closest to, and to the left of, α˜, which are, respectively, α1 = 0.4
and α1 = 0.5.
4 Experimentation
There are many directions in which our model can be extended. Here, we consider
experimentation which is particularly relevant. There are two reasons for doing so.
First, it demonstrates by example that our results also hold in a model where the decision
19The standard errors are 0.03 and 0.05. The complete simulation data and the tables augmented
with standard errors are available at http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/witheo/aleks/.
20In Table 1, the probability decreases from 0.26 (0.04) to 0.21 (0.04), while in Table 2 it decreases
from 0.36 (0.05) to 0.21 (0.04), where standard errors are in parentheses. Thus, the difference between
0.36 and 0.21 in Table 2 is statistically significant whereas the difference between 0.26 and 0.21 in Table
1 is not.
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maker is not choosing the tax rate which is optimal for the median household. Second,
so far we have assumed that the decision maker behaves myopically. This is in particular
questionable if the economy is stuck in the information trap since the decision maker
knows that reaching τ˜ is bad : it prevents learning with probability one. It is thus of
particular relevance to check whether the result that the economy may end up in an
information trap breaks down when we endow the decision maker with some forward
looking ability. We do this by allowing him do experiments.
A plausible, and feasible, way of modelling foresighted and experimenting behavior
is the following. In any period t, let the decision maker choose τmt − ∆ and τmt + ∆,
where ∆ > 0 measures the degree of foresightedness and τmt is the still myopic bliss point
tax rate of the median household. The implemented policy is determined by flipping a
fair coin.21 The larger ∆, the greater the degree of foresightedness and/or the larger the
willingness to experiment.
The question that interests us is whether in the long-run beliefs converge towards
α∞ = α˜ with positive probability. To answer this question, we use again simulations.
The results are collected in Table 3. The true production function HA and the alternative
HG are the same as in Table 1 above. We set σ = 1 and let α1 increase from 0.1 to 0.9,
while ∆ increases from 0.00001 to 0.1. (The first column with ∆ = 0 is a reprint from
Table 1.) For each pair (α1,∆), we ran 100 draws. Table entries give the number of
draws for which the process ended with beliefs α∞ = 1. In this case, the good policy τmA
21Alternatively, one could have a percentage experimentation, according to which positions would be
(1 − ∆)τmt and (1 + ∆)τmt . The assumption that randomization is fifty-fifty is made for convenience.
We expect the results to be robust to other distributions as long as these are not too skewed towards
the true production function.
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is implemented in the long run.22
HA and HG
α˜ = 0.47
σ = 1
∆ =
0
∆ =
0.00001
∆ =
0.0001
∆ =
0.001
∆ =
0.01
∆ =
0.1
α1 = 0.1 0.21 0.43 0.68 0.95 1 1
α1 = 0.2 0.26 0.43 0.66 0.95 0.99 1
α1 = 0.3 0.24 0.43 0.68 0.94 0.99 1
α1 = 0.4 0.21 0.36 0.67 0.94 0.99 1
α1 = 0.5 0.25 0.48 0.74 0.94 0.99 1
α1 = 0.6 0.57 0.69 0.85 0.97 1 1
α1 = 0.7 0.76 0.79 0.90 0.99 1 1
α1 = 0.8 0.94 0.93 0.97 1 1 1
α1 = 0.9 0.91 0.97 0.99 1 1 1
Table 3: Simulation results for the model with experimentation.
We observe the following. First, if ∆ is sufficiently large, in particular larger than 0.1,
then the truth is always learnt in the long-run. Note that ∆ = 0.1 implies a difference
between the policy platforms of 10 percentage points. Even with ∆ = 0.01, convergence
to the Pareto efficient policy is still almost universal. However, as ∆ becomes smaller,
the probability of convergence to α∞ = 1 decreases, too. For example, for ∆ = 0.0001
and α1 ≤ 0.4, less than 70 out of the 100 draws converged to α∞ = 1. Of course,
∆ = 0.0001 corresponds to one percent of a percent and is thus admittedly a very small
policy difference. Nonetheless, it represents a positive amount of experimentation and
reflects at least some degree of forward looking behavior. Hence, we conclude that our
information trap result does not break down ’as soon as even the slightest degree of non-
myopic behavior or experimentation is allowed for’, as one reader conjectured. Second,
22Obviously, this is true only in an approximate sense because given our modelling assumptions
experimentation continues even with α∞ = 1.
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consider the column with ∆ = 0.0001 to see that the non-monotonicity in α1 observed
above carries over to the model with experimentation.23
5 Conclusions
We consider an economy where there is uncertainty about how the economy functions.
In every period, the decision maker implements a policy. Observations of policies and
economic outcomes are used to update the decision makers beliefs, which then serve as
the basis for decision making in the following period. We show that the economy can
end up in an information trap where no further learning is possible. This result is robust
with respect to the introduction of experimentation.
Putnam (1993) has raised the question why some governments fail and others suc-
ceed. He explains the failure and success of democracies by referring to differences in
political institutions and attitudes. We have provided an alternative explanation why
initially identical societies may differ in the long run and more specifically, why some
countries may adopt Pareto inferior policies even in the long run. Our explanation is
that decision makers face uncertainty and that uncertainty can only be unravelled by
experience. Initially identical countries may end up with different outcomes because in
combination with bad luck the equilibrium may impede further inferences, so that the
uncertainty is never abolished.24 Since in our model economies may fail to converge to
23Though the ∆’s for which non-convergence to τmA is obtained appear rather small, it should be
noted that the size of ∆ is only meaningful in relation to the slopes of HA and HB in the neighborhood
of τ˜ : The smaller the difference in these slopes, the larger ∆ can be for non-convergence to occur with
positive probability. An example is available upon request/in the Webappendix.
24Among other things, we have shown that initial beliefs may be crucial for the long run political
outcome. This may help better understand the economic and political difficulties former colonies face
who may have been endowed with bad initial beliefs at the time of independence, as emphasized, e.g.,
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Pareto efficient policies as a consequence of bad shocks, its predictions are consistent
with the observations of Easterly (2001), who notes that some countries’ meager growth
performance may be caused by bad luck.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Since HA and HB are concave, Ht(τt) is concave. For any
concave function and beliefs αt, the distribution function for τ
i
t can be derived using
standard techniques for the transformation of random variables.25 Let τ it = κ(yi) denote
the inverse of the function yi = H
′
t(τ
i
t ) derived from the optimality condition
∂H(τ i)
∂τ
= yi
of the model without uncertainty. Since H ′′t (τ
i
t ) exists,
dyi
dτ it
= H ′′t (τ
i
t ). If we denote
by Ω(τ it ) the distribution of τ
i
t , then the density ω(τ
i
t ) of Ω(τ
i
t ) is given by ω(τ
i
t ) =
f(κ(τ it )) | dyidτ it |, where |
dyi
dτ i
| denotes the absolute value of the derivative dyi
dτ it
= H ′′t (τ
i
t ).
Consequently, the optimal tax rate of the voter with the median income is the median
optimal tax rate. In any period t the median household’s optimal tax rate under the
expected production function Ht(τt) defined in (2) is implemented in equilibrium. Since
by definition ∂HA
∂τ
(τmA ) =
∂HB
∂τ
(τmB ) and since HA(τ) and HB(τ) are both concave, we know
that ∂HA
∂τ
> ym and ∂HB
∂τ
> ym for all τ < τmA . Hence, since αt ≤ 1 for all t, τmt ≥ τmA for
all t follows. Symmetric arguments can be applied to rule out τmt > τ
m
B . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2 We prove Proposition 2 by showing that the decision maker’s
belief αt converges to a random variable α∞ almost surely. From Proposition 1 we then
get the convergence result for τmt .
by Bauer (1981).
25See, e.g., Hogg and Craig (1995).
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We first define the function s(τ) ≡ HA(τ)−HB(τ) for τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ]. The fact that
s′(τ) < 0 for τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ] is readily established, using H ′A(τ) < H ′B(τ) for τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ],
which follows from concavity of both HA and HB and the fact that H
′
A(τ
m
A ) = H
′
B(τ
m
B ).
Note that for τ˜ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], s(τ˜) = 0. Therefore, s(τmA ) > 0 and s(τmB ) < 0.
Let us also define the function τm(αt), which is the tax rate solving the equation
in Proposition 1 as a function of the beliefs αt. So for a given belief αt we have τ
m
t =
τm(αt), the unique optimal tax rate of the median voter. Using the implicit function
theorem, we have
∂τmt
∂αt
=
−s′(τmt )
αtH′′A(τ
m
t )+(1−αt)H′′B(τmt ) < 0, since −s
′ > 0 and αtH ′′A + (1 −
αt)H
′′
B < 0 by concavity. This is also quite intuitive. As the beliefs that HA is true
increase, the equilibrium tax rate decreases, i.e., is closer to τmA . Finally, let us define
w(αt) ≡ s(τm(αt)), which gives us the difference between the two production function
in equilibrium as a function of the beliefs in period t. The function w is defined on
the interval [0, 1]. The fact that ∂w
∂αt
= s′τm′ > 0 follows immediately from the above
observations. Moreover, because with τ˜ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], s(τ˜) = 0, we have w(α(τ˜)) = 0 for a
unique α˜ ∈ (0, 1) and −∞ < w(0) < 0 < w(1) <∞.
Let α1 = Pr(HA) and 1 − α1 = Pr(HB) be the exogenously given prior beliefs that
HA and HB are true, respectively, and let
Pr(ht|HA) = φ(ht −HA(τt)) = φ(εt) and Pr(ht|HB) = φ(ht −HB(τt)) = φ(w(αt) + εt),
be the respective probabilities of observing ht when HA and when HB is true, where
φ(.) is the density of the normal with mean zero and variance σ2.26 After history Ht =
26Note that for a continuous random variable any single observation has probability zero. Nonetheless,
L’Hoˆpital’s rule can be used to determine to posterior probability, so that the density rather than the
cdf is appropriate.
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{(hi, τi)}ti=1, the period t+ 1 belief can be written as
αt+1 =
1
1 + Pr(HB) Pr(h1|HB) Pr(h2|HB)...Pr(ht|HB)
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) Pr(h2|HA)...Pr(ht|HA)
=
1
1 + (1−α1)φ(w(α1)+ε1)φ(w(α2)+ε2)...φ(w(αt)+εt)
α1φ(ε1)φ(ε2)...φ(εt)
.
(6)
Define
Nt+1 ≡ (1− α1)φ(w(α1) + ε1)φ(w(α2) + ε2) · ... · φ(w(αt) + εt)
α1φ(ε1)φ(ε2) · ... · φ(εt) , (7)
such that (6) becomes αt+1 =
1
1+Nt+1
. This defines the function αt = α(Nt) with
∂α(Nt)
∂Nt
<
0. Note also that αt+1 ∈ (0, 1]⇔ Nt+1 ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, we can now define a sequence
of random variables {Ni}ti=1, the initial value of which is exogenously given as N1 = 1−α1α1 .
Finally define r(Nt) ≡ w(α(Nt)), where ∂r∂Nt = ∂w∂αt ∂αt∂Nt < 0 is readily established. It is
also easy to see that r(0) = w(1) > 0 and that limNt→∞ r(Nt) = w(0) < 0. Thus, for
τ˜ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], there is a unique N˜ such that r(N˜) = 0. In light of these new definitions,
Nt+1 = N1 · φ(r(N1) + ε1)
φ(ε1)
· φ(r(N2) + ε2)
φ(ε2)
· ... · φ(r(Nt) + εt)
φ(εt)
= Nt · φ(r(Nt) + εt)
φ(εt)
. (8)
Notice that (8) is a non-linear stochastic first-order difference equation.
Observe first that if the sequence takes either the value 0 or the value N˜ , it will take
this value forever. This becomes immediate for Nt = 0 by inserting Nt = 0 into (8). For
Nt = N˜ , r(N˜) = 0 implies that
φ(r(Nt)+εt)
φ(εt)
= φ(εt)
φ(εt)
= 1, implying in turn Nt+1 = N˜ . If Nt
is infinity, Nt+1 will be too, since limNt→∞ r(Nt) is a finite negative number.
Note also that the sequence {Nt} is a martingale. The reason is first that
E[Nt+1] =
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
Nt+1 · φ(ε1, ..., εt) dε1 ... dεt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
N1 · φ(r(N1) + ε1) · ... · φ(r(Nt) + εt) dε1 ... dεt = N1 < ∞,
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where the joint normal φ(ε1, ε2, ..., εt) = φ(ε1) ·φ(ε2) · ... ·φ(εt) by independence. Second,
E[Nt+1|{Ni}ti=1] = Nt
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(r(Nt) + εt)
φ(εt)
φ(εt) dεt = Nt
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(r(Nt) + εt) dεt = Nt .
The martingale convergence theorem (e.g., Durrett, 2005, p. 233) states that {Nt}
converges almost surely to a limit N∞ with E[N∞] < ∞. For the interpretation of our
model, it is necessary to evaluate the random variable N∞. Lemma 1 states that the
martingale either converges towards 0 or towards N˜ .
Lemma 1 The support of the random variable N∞ is {0, N˜}.
Proof. From the observation we made above, we know that Pr(Nt+1 = 0|Nt = 0) = 1
and Pr(Nt+1 = N˜ |Nt = N˜) = 1. We now prove by contradiction that there exists no
other value C the martingale Nt can converge to. Note that the martingale convergence
theorem directly states that Nt cannot converge to infinity.
Assume there exists a number C ∈ (0,∞) where Nt can converge to. Then, for every
δ ∈ IR such that 0 6∈ [C − δ, C + δ] and N˜ 6∈ [C − δ, C + δ], there exists a time period
tδ, for which we have Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ] for i = 0, 1, ... . Note that δ can be chosen
arbitrarily small. Now define the variable εtδ+i by
εtδ+i ≡
σ2
r(Ntδ+i)
· ln Ntδ+i
C + δ
− 1
2
r(Ntδ+i) . (9)
Note that εtδ+i is a shock such that Ntδ+i+1 = C + δ. Assume that C < N˜ . Then, the
variable εtδ+i is negative and finite for all Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ], because all terms in (9)
are finite. Therefore, for every Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ], Pr(εtδ+i < εtδ+i) = Φ(εtδ+i) > 0,
which means that the probability to draw an εtδ+i < εtδ+i is strictly positive for every
Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ]. Thus, with a positive probability we observe an Ntδ+i+1 >
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C + δ for every period tδ + i because Ntδ+i+1 depends negatively on εtδ+i. This means,
that infNtδ+i∈[C−δ,C+δ] Pr(Ntδ+i+1 6∈ [C − δ, C + δ]) > 0 , which is a contradiction to the
assumption of convergence of Nt. Hence, Nt cannot converge to C.
In order to prove non-convergence towards a C > N˜ , we define εtδ+i as εtδ+i ≡
σ2
r(Ntδ+i)
· ln Ntδ+i
C−δ − 12 r(Ntδ+i) and use the equivalent reasoning as above.
We are now only left to show that the probability of Nt converging to the set union of
all C is still 0. By choosing intervals around C with rational endpoints, the probabilities
can be summed up for the union set. Since we can choose δ arbitrarily, it is always
possible to find an interval with rational endpoints for all C. Therefore, the sum of
probabilities over these intervals is 0. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 2
From Slutzki’s Theorem we know that if Nt converges to N∞ with support {0, N˜} almost
surely, then αt converges to α∞ with support {α˜, 1} almost surely. For the belief αt = 1
the tax rate τmA is implemented, for α˜ it is τ˜ . Therefore, the support of τ∞ is {τmA , τ˜}.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ¥
Proof of Corollary 2 It is clear that if HA(τ) 6= HB(τ) for all τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], then
the function s(τ) ≡ HA(τ) − HB(τ) is never equal to zero in the relevant interval.
Consequently, the functions ω(αt) and r(Nt) defined in the proof of Proposition 2 will
also be non-zero in the relevant range. Therefore, equation (8) has a unique fixed point,
which is Nt+1 = Nt = 0, corresponding to αt+1 = αt = 1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3 From Proposition 2 we know that αt either converges to 1
or to α˜. What we need to characterize in order to prove Proposition 3 is actually the
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distribution of the random variable N∞ over {0, N˜}, from which we can then deduce the
distribution of the random variable α∞ over {1, α˜}. Corollary 2.11 in Durrett (2005)
implies that E[N∞] ≤ E[N1]. Let µ be the probability of convergence towards N˜ . Then
E[N∞] = (1 − µ) · 0 + µ · N˜ = µ · N˜ , which implies µ ≤ N1N˜ and hence
(1 − µ) ≥ 1 − N1
N˜
, where it will be recalled that N1 =
1−α1
α1
and hence E[N1] = N1.
As it is a probability, ξ must be nonnegative. It equals the minimum value of (1− µ) if
(1− µ) > 0. Hence,
ξ = max
{
0, 1− N1
N˜
}
= max
{
0, 1−
1−α1
α1
1−α˜
α˜
}
= max
{
0,
α1 − α˜
α1(1− α˜)
}
.¥
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